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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of legal malpractice cases has increased dramatically in the
last two decades.I A review of the number of such cases reported in regional
or state digests for most areas of this country reveals that there probably are
more reported cases of legal malpractice in the last twenty years than in all of
such cases recorded prior to that time.
Although the subject of expert testimony in professional liability cases has
been evolving for some time and is fairly well developed in some areas, such
as medical malpractice, only in recent years has it received significant
attention in legal malpractice cases. In many of the earlier malpractice cases,
the concept of attorney liability was decided without reference to expert
testimony. However, recently expert testimony is usually examined at length,
and questions regarding the necessity and scope of such testimony have
become pivotal points upon which decisions turn.
Professional liability cases generally involve the question of whether the
professional failed to perform to an acceptable level of competence in some
generally recognized and accepted practice in the particular profession.2
Because the professional's conduct is measured against a standard of care
followed by others in the particular profession,' it stands to reason that lay
persons would not be able to determine those standards or measure the
professional's conduct against them without the assistance of expert testimony
from one in the same profession. With this generality in mind, the question
arises whether legal malpractice cases are somehow different from other types
of professional malpractice cases thus requiring different rules of liability -
the short answer is "yes."
Legal malpractice cases are different from other professional liability
cases for several reasons. First, in legal malpractice cases, four of the six
1. See WILLIAM H. GATES & SHEREE L. SWETIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAW. PROF.
LIABILITY, CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL
MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER (1989) (discussing the latest legal malpractice statistics from the
American Bar Association).
2. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297 S.C. 430, 435, 377 S.E.2d 323, 326
(1989) (per curiam).
3. Id.
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main actors are lawyers: the plaintiff's attorney, the defense attorney, the
defendant, and the trial judge. The only nonlawyers directly concerned with
the malpractice question are the plaintiff and the jury. Therefore, the lawyers
and judge often have some understanding of the malpractice issues and some
impression of how to explain those issues to the jury through either arguments
or instructions. As will be seen, this type of thinking has influenced a number
of decisions regarding the necessity of expert testimony.
A second significant difference between legal malpractice and other types
of professional liability cases is that the manner in which lawyers conduct their
practices is guided to some degree by their knowledge and understanding of
the law. It sometimes becomes difficult to distinguish between questions of
law and questions of fact, because questions that pertain to the lawyer's
conduct necessarily contain both factual elements and elements regarding the
lawyer's understanding of the law. Because of this mixture, substantial
confusion arises regarding the proper subject and scope of expert testimony.4
A third unique feature in legal malpractice cases is the concept of the
"case-within-a-case" as an element of proximate cause. The case-within-a-case
concept, as it relates to expert testimony, is the subject of some controversy
and is also discussed below.
The unique features that differentiate the handling of expert witness
testimony in legal malpractice cases from other professional malpractice cases
raise problems that can be avoided or dealt with before they actually become
problematic. This article attempts to provide the practitioner with some
guidance in the use of expert testimony in legal malpractice cases. It discusses
both the general rules governing expert witness testimony in legal malpractice
cases and the areas that appear to be unique and difficult to resolve. In some
sections, the reader will find more questions than answers; however,
awareness of problem areas provides the practitioner with an opportunity to
address those problems before they adversely affect the outcome of their
client's cases.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
The relationship between expert witness testimony and the elements of a
legal malpractice claim raise multiple issues that go beyond those raised in
other professional malpractice cases. The four elements of a legal malpractice
claim are:
4. See Thomas E. Baker, The Impropriety of Expert Witness Testimony on the Law, 40 KAN.
L. REV. 325 (1992); Charles W. Ehrhardt, The Conflict Concerning Expert Witnesses and Legal
Conclusions, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 645 (1990); Charles M. Leibson, Legal Malpractice Cases:
Special Problems in Identifying Issues of Law and Fact and in the Use of Expert Testimony, 75
KY. L.J. 1 (1986-87); Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARV. L. REv. 797 (1984).
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1. the existence of an attorney-client relationship;
2. the attorney's breach of a duty through an act or omission;
3. damage to the client; and
4. a proximate cause relationship between the breach of duty and the
damages. 5
Because the attorney-client relationship is not usually addressed by the
expert,6 the first element requiring expert testimony is the standard of care
and its breach. The issue of breach of a duty involves questions of both law
and fact and is the most frequent subject of expert testimony. The duties owed
by the attorney to a client may arise out of the employment contract, but most
often are implied by operation of law. The implied duty requires that
attorneys perform to a standard of care that protects the client from harm
caused by the attorney's actions. Attorneys are required to use their best
judgment and to utilize reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in both the
exercise of professional skill and the application of professional knowledge.7
Expert testimony is used to define the standard of care to which attorneys must
conform by explaining how attorneys conduct their affairs under given
circumstances. In some cases, the expert may also testify about the attorney's
breach of duty by offering an opinion that the conduct of the attorney deviated
from the standard of care. Modern cases generally agree that the question of
the standard of care and its breach are proper subjects of expert testimony. 8
Substantial controversy exists concerning the use of expert testimony in
questions of proximate cause and damages in legal malpractice cases. In a
legal malpractice case, the client initially came to the lawyer because the client
had a legal problem. Thus, if the lawyer breached some duty to the client, the
issue is whether the breach harmed the client by negatively impacting the
5. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916); Cianbro Corp. v.
Jeffcoat& Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784,789 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing South Carolina State Ports Auth.
v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 376, 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (1986) and Shealy v.
Walters, 273 S.C. 330, 335, 256 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1979) (per curiam)), af'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th
Cir. 1993) (mem.); Klein v. Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d 738, 743 (N.D. 1990) (citing Wastvedt
v. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1988)); Nelson v. Taoka, 611 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992) (citing Belfer v. Spiegel, 480 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)); Davis v.
Vesely, 707 P.2d 627, 628 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Harding v. Bell, 508 P.2d 216 (Or.
1973)); 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.1, at 401 (3d
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter MALLEN & SMITH].
6. The existence of an attorney-client relationship is usually considered an issue of fact not
requiring expert testimony, 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 5, § 27.10, at 652, and therefore
is not discussed in this article. Additionally, the limited class of cases in which non-clients may
sue lawyers is beyond the scope of this article.
7. Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin, 804 F. Supp. at 790 (quoting Norris v. Alexander,
246 S.C. 14, 18, 142 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1965) (per curiam)).
8. See 2 MALLEN & SMrTH, supra note 5, § 27.16, at 676-81.
[Vol. 45:727
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resolution of the client's legal problem. However, if the result would have
been the same regardless of what the lawyer did or did not do, no causal
relationship exits between the breach of duty and the detriment suffered by the
client.
The case-within-a-case concept is often employed to explain the causal
relationship between the attorney's breach of a duty and the harm suffered by
the client. This concept is best illustrated using examples. For instance, if the
client employs a lawyer to defend a case and the lawyer allows the case to go
into default, arguably no harm occurred if the client had no available defense
anyway and the judgment was justly entered.'
Another example is when an attorney is hired to represent an injured party
in an automobile accident and, through neglect, the attorney allows the statute
of limitations to run on the claim. Traditionally, the client would have to
prove proximate cause and damages in this type of case by trying the
automobile accident case within the legal malpractice case. Based upon
evidence pertaining to the accident and the injuries, the jury then determines
the causal relationship between the attorney's neglect and its impact on the
client's accident case. If the client did not have a viable claim or suffered no
injuries in the automobile accident, the client arguably has not been harmed
by the attorney's neglect. Note that this approach to proximate cause and
damages may not require expert testimony because juries routinely decide
automobile accident cases without expert assistance.
On the other hand, an expired statute of limitations in an automobile
accident case may raise further expert testimony issues regarding causation.
Should the court permit an attorney experienced in automobile accident cases
to testify about the settlement value of the case and bypass actually trying the
auto accident case within the legal malpractice case? Reaching even further,
should the court permit the expert to opine about the likely outcome of the
auto accident case if it had been tried? These are the types of problems
encountered when the expert ventures beyond the standard of care question.
Although generally necessary for proving the elements of standard of care
and its breach, expert testimony in legal malpractice cases raises novel and
difficult questions, especially in regard to the element of causation and
damages. The issues concerning the role of expert testimony impact many
aspects including the admissibility, necessity, scope, and sufficiency of such
testimony.
9. E.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1916). The burdens set
out in Price have been widely followed in the United States. 2 ROBERT R. HuMS, THE DEFENSE
RESEARCH INST., INC., PROFESSIONAL LIABiLrrY: LiABILrrY OF ATrORNEYS 43 (Donald J. Hirsh
& Stephen L. Liebo eds., 1975).
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III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. General Rule
The modem trend of the law, as reflected in Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Rule 43 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, is to allow expert testimony from a qualified witness where scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence or in determining the facts in issue. '° However, expert witness
testimony in legal malpractice cases requires an additional element of proof.
In addition to meeting the general requirement that the testimony must assist
the trier of fact, expert witness testimony in legal malpractice cases must also
tend to support or refute an element of legal malpractice.
The expert's testimony must meet both of these requirements when
offered in regard to the standard of care and its breach. The standard of care
in malpractice cases is based upon the skill and care ordinarily exercised by
the professional. This information is rarely within the common knowledge of
lay persons, and without expert testimony, the jury would be left to speculate
about how a reasonably prudent lawyer would have acted under similar
circumstances. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
It is not discernible how a jury, without evidence, could determine what
constitutes ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members of the
legal profession. Without expert testimony, it was left to a jury of laymen
to determine the reasonable care and diligence which lawyers usually
exercise when confronted with the same or a similar situation.'1
Because of the evidentiary requirement to prove the standard of care, every
jurisdiction that has addressed the question has held that expert testimony is
indeed admissible in legal malpractice cases.'
2
10. FED. R. EVlD. 702; S.C. R. Civ. P. 43(m) (Supp. 1993).
11. Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1966).
12. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 27.15, at 665; Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis
F. McLaughlin, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice
Cases, 61 TEmP. L. REv. 1351 (1988); H. Paul Breslin & Joseph P. McMonigle, Expert
Testimony in Legal Malpractice Actions, LING., Fall 1979, at 30; Louis M. Brown & Ruth C.
Tachna, Dealing with the Lawyer as Expert Witness, PRAc. LAw., Oct. 15, 1985, at 11; Francis
M. Hanna & William C. Ruggiero, Legal Malpractice Litigation in Missouri, J. Mo. B., March
1992, at 97; Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARv. L. REV. 797 (1984); Dwain E. Fagerlund,
Note, Legal Malpractice: The Locality Rule and Other Limitations of the Standard of Care:
Should Rural and Metropolitan Lawyers be Held to the Same Standard of Care?, 64 N.D. L,
EVv. 661 (1988); Les Jones, Note, Evidence-Cleckner v. Dale: Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice Cases, 18 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 555
(1988); Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as
[Vol. 45:727
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B. The Necessity of Expert Testimony
The general rule in legal malpractice cases is that expert testimony is
ordinarily required to establish a prima facie case. 13 Indeed, it may even be
malpractice to attempt to litigate a legal malpractice case without expert
testimony. As the court stated in Brizak v. Needle, 4 "[A] plaintiff's attorney
who litigates a legal malpractice claim without the opinion testimony of a legal
expert unnecessarily exposes his client to a serious risk of dismissal."
5
Further, the plaintiff's failure to develop expert testimony prior to trial has
resulted in summary judgment in a number of cases.1 6
The fact that an attorney may have made a mistake does not necessarily
establish that the attorney deviated from the standard of care. 17 As the court
in Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein'8 stated, "Some
allowance must always be made for the imperfection of human judgment."19
Also, proof of a bad result is not sufficient to support a malpractice claim
without further proof of a deviation from the applicable standard of care.Y°
to Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action AgainstAttorney, 14 A.L.R. 4TH
170 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
13. See, e.g., Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784, 790-91 (D.S.C. 1992)
(citing Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 80, 367 S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 1988) and quoting
Pederson v. Gould, 288 S.C. 141, 143, 341 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1986)), aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th
Cir. 1993) (mem.); Boigegrain v. Gilbert, 784 P.2d 849, 850 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Berman v. Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)); Pearl v. Nelson, 534 A.2d 1257, 1259
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Hamilton v. Needham, 519 A.2d 172, 174 (D.C. 1986) (quoting O'Neil
v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982)); Rose v. Rollins, 306 S.E.2d 724, 725 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983) (quoting Hughes v. Malone, 247 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)); see Brizak v.
Needle, 571 A.2d 975, 982-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 (N.J.
1990). As these cases demonstrate, however, the courts recognize an exception to the
requirementof expert testimony when the attorney's negligence is so obvious that lay persons can
evaluate the attorney's conduct based on their own common knowledge and experience. See infra
text accompanying notes 29-57 (discussing the common experience exception to the requirement
of expert testimony).
14. 571 A.2d 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 (N.J. 1990).
15. Id. at 984.
16. E.g., Cianbro, 804 F. Supp. at 791-93; Applegate v. Dobrovir, Oakes & Gebhardt, 628
F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 809 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1049 (1987); Biogegrain, 784 P.2d at 850; Howard v. Walker, 249 S.E.2d 45, 46 (Ga. 1978)
(per curiam); 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 5, § 27.22, at 690-91.
17. Cianbro, 804 F. Supp. at 789 (citing Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985)).
18. 515 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
19. Id. at 894 (quoting Stevens v. Walker & Dexter, 55 Ill. 151, 153 (1870)).
20. See Bass v. Farr, _ S.C. _, 434 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1993).
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C. Implications for Expert Testimony in Bench and Jury Trials
A recurring question is whether it makes any difference regarding the
necessity of expert testimony if the legal malpractice case is tried before a
judge rather than a jury. After all, it would appear that the judge, as a
lawyer, is obviously capable of understanding an attorney's duties and
obligations. However, the courts have generally rejected the proposition that
a bench trial obviates the necessity for an expert.2'
Several reasons exist for rejecting the view that expert testimony is not
necessary in bench trials. The most basic reason for not dispensing with
expert testimony in bench trials is that cases should be decided on evidence
and not on personal knowledge. If the trial judge determines the standard of
care based on the judge's own knowledge, the adequacy of the judge's findings
cannot be determined upon appellate review. Even if the judge explains the
reasons in the opinion, no opportunity exists during trial for cross examination
or rebuttal regarding the judge's determination of the standard of care. As a
result, some courts have held that it would be a denial of due process for a
judge to make such a finding without the underlying testimony of an expert. 2
A second reason for not dispensing with expert testimony in bench trials
is that trial judges are not knowledgeable about all areas of practice. But,
even in those areas where a judge is knowledgeable, a judicial determination
of the standard of care would be subjective and therefore unacceptable.
Again, the judge's findings would be difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate.
This is not to say that a judge should never decide the standard of care in
a malpractice case without expert testimony. Even in jury trials, some cases
do not require expert testimony.' Also, in some limited cases the standard
of care may be determined by referring to a statute, rule, or commonly
accepted treatise on the issue.24 However, absent these circumstances and in
the interest of uniformity, the better practice is to require expert testimony in
both bench and jury trials.' It logically follows that if a judge should not
decide the standard of care in a bench trial without expert testimony, a jury
trial judge should not dispense with expert testimony by instructing the jury
21. Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1979); Bonhiver v.
Rotenberg, Schwartzman & Richards, 461 F.2d 925, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting People v.
Wallenberg, 181 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ill. 1962)); House v. Maddox, 360 N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (I11.
App. Ct. 1977); Fishow v. Simpson, 462 A.2d 540, 544 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); see also
Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 1382-85 (discussing the necessity of expert witness
testimony in legal malpractice bench trials).
22. See Bonhiver, 461 F.2d at 928-29; House, 360 N.E.2d at 583.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 30-43.
24. Fall River Say. Bank v. Callahan, 463 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 465
N.E.2d 26 (Mass. 1984).
25. Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 481 (3rd Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 45:727
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on the standard of care.6
D. Specialists
The subject of specialists raises interesting questions regarding qualifica-
tions of experts and the scope of expert testimony. Most courts agree,
however, that in the technical specialties - such as taxation, probate, patent,
trademark, and admiralty law - expert testimony is almost always necessary
to prove the standard of care and any breach.' In these types of cases, the
deviation or breach may not be understood by laymen without the assistance
of additional expert testimony. For example, in a complex tax case the jury
may need expert testimony not only to explain what a tax practitioner would
do under certain circumstances, but also to explain why the conduct of the
defendant attorney was a deviation. 8
IV. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF NECESSITY
A. The Common Experience Exception
Courts that hold expert testimony is admissible and generally required in
legal malpractice cases also recognize an exception to the expert testimony
requirement when the alleged act of malpractice is clear and obvious,
exceptionally egregious, or clearly palpable in that lay persons can determine
from their own common knowledge and experience whether the attorney
breached a standard of care.29 For simplicity, the exception is referred to as
26. See Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535, 541-42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); see also Jones,
supra note 12, at 561-62 (discussing the Cleckner case).
27. 2 MALLEN & SMrTH, supra note 5, § 27.15, at 670; Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note
12, at 1366 (citing Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (Ct. App. 1975)). In some
cases, once the standard of care is established by expert testimony, the deviation or breach of
duty can be determined without the aid of additional expert testimony because it is easily
understandableby laymen. See, e.g., Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 81,367 S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ct.
App. 1988) (stating that additional expert testimony was not required because the defendant
attorney himself had established the applicable standard of care in his published responses to
interrogatories and depositions).
28. See, e.g., Bent v. Green, 466 A.2d 322, 325-26 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983) (discussing the
need for expert testimony in a client's legal malpractice defense to a tax attorney's suit for legal
fees).
29. E.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196,218 (1st Cir. 1987); Asphalt Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Galusha, 770 P.2d 1180, 1181-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89,
102 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986); Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal.
Rptr. 528, 545 (Ct. App. 1984); Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (Mass. App. Ct.
1981); Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Mont. 1987); Swanson v. Sheppard, 445
N.W.2d 654, 657 (N.D. 1989); Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 66 (Pa. 1989) (citing Lentino v.
Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979)); Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 64
9
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the "common experience" exception to the requirement of expert testimony in
legal malpractice claims. A discussion of a few noteworthy cases will
illustrate tie concept.
In Day v. Rosenthal30 an attorney sued the actress Doris Day and her
late husband for breach of a retainer agreement. 31 The defendants counter-
claimed alleging negligence.32 At trial, the attorney was found liable to his
clients for twenty-six million dollars. On appeal, the attorney argued that
the plaintiff had not proven his negligence through expert testimony. 4 The
appellate court found that the attorney had, among other things: (1) received
undisclosed profits from investment of his clients' funds; (2) created alter ego
corporations and surreptitiously syphoned the clients' monies into his own
pockets; (3) loaned the clients' monies to himself; (4) secretly represented
promoters of ventures into which he induced the clients to become investors;
(5) repeatedly involved his clients in business relationships with other clients
without revealing his dual representation; and (6) commingled, misapplied, and
failed to account for the clients' funds. 5
The court noted that the attorney's conduct was so irresponsible that it
seriously disregarded basic attorney obligations, reeked of negligence, and
violated the basic precepts in the traditional relationship of attorney and
client.36 Further, it held that the attorney's blatant violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct established a deviation from standards and observed that
"[i]t required no expert to tell the trial court that [the attorney's] perverted
sense of duty to his client. . . is attorney negligence."31
Although the Day case was factually complicated,38 it was quite simple
regarding the concept of the standard of care in that the jury did not require
expert testimony to determine that dishonest conduct is indeed malpractice.
The Day court even suggested that expert testimony would be inappropriate in
such a case.
39
In a First Circuit case, Wagenmann v. Adams,4" the plaintiff was arrested
and temporarily incarcerated in a mental institution. His court appointed
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 71 (Pa. 1989).
30. 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1985).
31. Id. at 94.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 93.
34. Id. at 99.
35. Day, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 94-98.
36. Id. at 102-04.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Id. at 93-98.
39. See id. at 102. ("If an expert testifies contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
standards established by the rules govern and the expert testimony is disregarded.").
40. 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).
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attorney did little or nothing to help him.4" The plaintiff subsequently sued
the arresting officers for civil rights violations and also sued the attorney for
malpractice.42 The jury returned a substantial verdict against the attorney.
On appeal, the attorney argued that the plaintiff had failed to introduce any
expert testimony to establish a standard of care or his deviation therefrom.43
However, the court held that the attorney's conduct was "so gross or
obvious" that no expert testimony was necessary.' The attorney's conduct
was negligent in many respects. First, the attorney ignored his client's
requests and protestations of innocence and did not seek a commitment
hearing, even though his client requested a hearing. Second, the attorney did
not interview the psychiatrist involved, even though he knew that the
psychiatrist was present in the courthouse and had rendered a favorable mental
evaluation of the client. Finally, the attorney failed to interview any of the
prosecution's witnesses.45
Additionally, the court noted that the jury had been instructed that the
burden was on the plaintiff to show both that the attorney was negligent and
that, but for his negligence, the plaintiff would not have been committed to the
mental institution.' The court also stated that the attorney's failure to act
after being retained to represent the client is the type of circumstance when
expert testimony is not required. The court stated:
When the events of this litigation are displayed against the backdrop
of the foregoing cases, it is clear that, because [the attorney] committed
malpractice "so gross and obvious" that expert testimony was not required
to prove it, this assignment of error must come to naught. Once the
attorney] undertook to represent [the client], he seems to have done almost
nothing to protect his client - either before or after commitment.47
In Betts v. Allstate Insurance Co." the plaintiff sued her insurer for bad
faith refusal to settle an automobile accident case and sued the attorney
furnished by the insurance company for negligently defending the suit.49 The
jury in the accident case had returned a verdict substantially in excess of the
policy limits. 50 The court found that despite a substantial risk of an adverse
41. Id. at 203-04.
42. Id. at 199.
43. Id. at 218.
44. Id. at 219.
45. Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 219-20.
46. Id. at 220-21.
47. Id. at 219.
48. 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Ct. App. 1984).
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id.
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verdict, the insurer absolutely rejected all offers to settle within the policy
limits.5 ' When the trial went badly, the attorney did not recommend to the
'insured that she should demand that the insurer settle within the policy limits.
Instead, the attorney told her not to worry.52 After the verdict, he did not
recommend that she seek independent counsel and instead recommended that
she decline assigning her rights against the insurer in exchange for a personal
release.53
The court found that the evidence established both that a conflict of
interest existed and that the attorney breached his duty to the insured by
putting the interests of the insurer first.54 The case rested upon a breach of
both the duty to inform and the duty to disclose in a conflict situation, and the
court held that no expert testimony was required:
[The attorney] asserts expert testimony was indispensable to a showing
of its breach of duty. Expert testimony is not required to establish legal
malpractice in all cases. This is not a case in which the question of breach
turned on legal technicalities requiring the fine exercise of professional
judgment. The issue was simply whether [the attorney] did or did not
abandon [the client's] best interests in deference to the conflicting interest
of [the insurer]. The proof on that issue was clear in its inculpatory
impact. It speaks for itself without the aid of expert opinion.55
The Betts case is somewhat of an anomaly and is discussed to demonstrate
that, in addition to cases like Day and Wagenmann, in which the attorney's
negligence was easy to understand, cases that involve difficult issues of
judgment and trial tactics - areas generally thought to require expert
testimony - do not always require expert testimony. However, the outcome
of Betts was apparently influenced by the perceived egregious conduct of the
attorney in that the trial court found that the attorney's conduct was not one
of mere negligence, but rather was "not the type of conduct to be condoned
in the legal profession. . . .,1 Finally, although the court eschewed the
necessity of expert testimony, in fact, expert testimony was offered at trial to
support the verdict. 7
51. Id. at 536-37.
52. Id. at 536, 545.
53. Betts, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
54. Id. at 545.
55. Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 546 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the trial court's opinion).
57. See id. at 545.
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V. EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
BY CLASSIFICATION OF ISSUES
Some courts have attempted to categorize the need for expert testimony
based on the issue involved. For example, in Carlson v. Morton8 the court
outlined the types of cases that typically fall within the common experience
exception. They include:
a. failure of a criminal defendant's attorney to appear in court on behalf
of his client;
b. failure to file suit within the statute of limitations;
c. failure to retain a first mortgage for a seller on real estate when such
retention is clearly part of the contract;
d. failure to notify the client that the attorney is resigning from the case,
thereby resulting in a default; and
e. failure to insulate one client from the debts of another client. 9
Unfortunately, such generalities are of limited use because for every such
case, either the facts in another case will suggest a different result or some
other court will simply disagree with where the line should be drawn between
the requirement of expert testimony and the common experience exception.
Thus, while general parameters may exist, there is no bright-line test to
determine when expert testimony is required. What appears obvious to one
court may not be obvious to another; however, the attorney must resolve any
doubt in favor of retaining an expert.
Lenius v. King illustrates how one judge's opinion regarding the
necessity of expert testimony may differ significantly from another judge's
opinion. In that case, the plaintiff employed an attorney to pursue two
mechanic's lien cases. The cases were dismissed for lack of prosecution, and
the plaintiff sued the attorney for malpractice. 6' Substantial expert testimony
was offered at trial regarding whether the plaintiff would have recovered in his
cases. 2 The trial court, however, granted the attorney's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's verdict for want of expert testimony that the attorney had
breached the standard of care. 3 On appeal, the majority agreed with the trial
court's conclusion that the complexity of the matter required expert testimony
58. 745 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1987).
59. Id. at 1137-38 (citations omitted).
60. 294 N.W.2d 912 (S.D. 1980).
61. Id. at 913.
62. See id. at 914.
63. Carlson, 745 P.2d at 913.
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on the standard of care.' The dissenting judge, however, dryly observed:
Finally, it does not take a Philadelphia lawyer to figure out that letting
actions lie dormant over six years and thirteen calendar calls until they are
dismissed for lack of prosecution is a breach of standards not only in the
legal profession but in any walk of life. The jury really needed no expert
testimony in that regard.
A. Breach of Contract or Express Instructions
In a few cases, courts have held that expert testimony is not necessary
when the claim is based on a contract breach or failure to follow a client's
express instructions. For example, in Mclnnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics' the
plaintiff instructed his attorney that none of his divorce proceedings should
appear in the newspaper because he lived in a small town and feared that
publication in the town's newspaper would be detrimental to his business. The
attorney, in writing, agreed to these instructions.67 However, the local
newspaper published the divorce when the attorney initiated service by
publication without first informing his client. In this case, the court held that
expert testimony was unnecessary because the attorney disobeyed the lawful
instructions of his client, thereby breaching their agreement.6"
In Asphalt Engineers, Inc. v. Galusha69 the plaintiff sued its attorney for
breach of contract and negligence based on the attorney's failing to file and
foreclose mechanic's liens as requested by the client and allowing the time for
filing to expire.70 The court held that liability attached based on breach of
contract without the need of expert testimony.71
In Jarnagin v. Terry72 the plaintiff sued her attorney for failing to follow
her instructions regarding division of marital debts. The plaintiff alleged that
she instructed the attorney that a specific debt should be made an obligation
of her husband and that although the attorney agreed to follow the instruction,
he did not do so.' The trial court granted a directed verdict for the attorney
at the close of the plaintiff's case based on the plaintiffs lack of expert
testimony.74 However, the case was reversed on appeal.75 The plaintiff's
64. Id. at 914-15.
65. Id. at 915 (Dunn, J., dissenting).
66. 461 N.E.2d 1295 (Ohio 1984).
67. Id. at 1296.
68. See id. at 1296-97.
69. 770 P.2d 1180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
70. id. at 1181.
71. id. at 1181-82.
72. 807 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
73. Id. at 191.
74. Id.
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claim was founded on breach of contract rather than negligence. As such, the
lawyer's duty to his client was not based on standards established by the legal
profession, but was instead based on the law of agency.76 The court thus
found that the lawyer's breach of duty and the flow of damages to the client
were within the common understanding of jurors.7
The above cases illustrate the variations of the common experience
exception. When the claim is based on a failure to follow agreed upon
instructions or to perform an agreed upon task, a trier of fact generally can
determine such an issue without expert testimony. On the other hand, if the
issue involves the attorney's competence in performing the task, a claim based
on breach of contract will not obviate the necessity of expert testimony,
because the question depends on the standard of care.
In Storm v. Golden78 the plaintiff sued her attorney for negligence and
breach of contract arising from the attorney's representation in a real estate
transaction. 79 The trial court granted a nonsuit for the attorney based on the
plaintiff's failure to offer expert testimony on the standard of care.8a On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that expert testimony was not necessary on her
contract claim."' The court noted that the breach of contract count did not
allege failure to follow specific instructions or breach of a specific provision
of a contract. Instead, the court found that the plaintiff's contract claim
"sounds in negligence by alleging [the attorney] failed to exercise the
appropriate standard of care."82
A contract of employment carries an implied covenant by the attorney to
exercise an appropriate standard of care. While a plaintiff may denominate a
claim as contractual, no real distinction exists between contract and tort claims
when the standard of care is the core issue, and the analysis to determine
whether expert testimony is required is the same analysis in either case. 3
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 191 (citing Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Wis. 1980)).
77. Jarnagin, 807 S.W.2d at 191 (citing McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 461 N.E.2d 1295,
1297 (Ohio 1984)).
78. 538 A.2d 61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 71 (Pa. 1989).
79. Id. at 62.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 65.
82. Id. at 65.
83. See Storm, 538 A.2d at 65; see also Wagenmarm v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 219 (1st Cir.
1987) (discussing the attorney's failure to abide by his client's wishes); Frank v. Bloom, 634
F.2d 1245, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 1980) (discussing proof necessary in establishing attorney
misconduct in contract matters); O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 343 (D.C. 1982) (stating that
the same standard of care is required of the attorney whether the claim is based on tort or
contract); Fishow v. Simpson, 462 A.2d 540, 544 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (holding that
expert witness testimony was required in a case where the cause of action for malpractice was
based on breach of contract).
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B. Testimony by the Defendant Attorney Regarding the Standard of Care
When the defendant attorney testifies about the standard of care and the
conduct that allegedly breached the standard, the plaintiff might not need to
offer further expert testimony to establish a prima facie case. In Mali v.
Odoms' a purchaser retained an attorney to examine the title to real property
and to handle the property closing.' The attorney knew that the purchaser
intended to operate a school on the property. However, the attorney failed to
disclose restrictive covenants on the property, and the purchaser sued the
attorney for malpractice after a court enjoined the purchaser from utilizing the
property for commercial use. 86 In response to the attorney's argument that
the plaintiff did not establish the standard of care by expert testimony, the
court noted that the defendant, a practicing attorney, had established the
applicable standard of care by admitting that he had a duty both to disclose the
restrictions and to explain their impact on the subject property. 8 Therefore,
the only evidence in dispute was whether the attorney provided such disclosure
and explanation at or prior to the closing.88 The court held that a jury could
determine whether the attorney breached the standard of care without further
expert testimony. 9
Similarly, in Asphalt Engineers, Inc. v. Galusha" the defendant attorney
answered hypothetically questions regarding the duties owed to a client and
what conduct would and would not meet the appropriate standard of care.
Based on this questioning, the court held that the attorney's acknowledgment
that the alleged conduct fell below the standard of care rendered additional
expert testimony unnecessary.91
An interesting question arises from cases such as those that hold that
additional expert witness testimony is not necessary when the defendant
attorney either testifies to the standard of care or concedes that the alleged
conduct constitutes negligence: Can a defendant attorney be compelled to
testify against himself in a legal malpractice action? As a practical matter, it
would seem difficult if not impossible for a defendant attorney to refuse to
testify to the standard of care and at the same time attempt to defend himself
in the malpractice action. On the other hand, when the plaintiff's attorney has
not deposed the defendant attorney or named him as an expert in discovery,
84. 295 S.C. 78, 367 S.E.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1988).
85. Id. at 80, 367 S.E.2d at 168.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 81, 367 S.E.2d at 168-69.
88.Id. at 81, 367 S.E.2d at 169.
89. Mali, 295 S.C. at 82, 367 S.E.2d at 169.
90. 770 P.2d 1180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
91. Id. at 1182.
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an attempt to call the him to testify might be defeated.' Several cases
illustrate this dilemma. In Gibson v. Talle the trial court refused to
compel the defendant attorney to answer hypothetical questions at deposition
seeking to elicit his opinion as an expert. 94 The Georgia Court of Appeals
upheld this ruling as within the trial judge's discretion to protect a witness
from oppressive and unfair questions and demands.9' Additionally, in Beattie
v. Firnschil9 6 the court stated that a plaintiff in a malpractice case may elicit
required expert testimony from the defendant attorney, but held that it was
within the trial court's discretion to admit or exclude such testimony. 97 The
trial court had excluded the testimony because the plaintiff gave no notice to
the defendant that he would be called as an expert.9"
C. Recurring Problem Areas
While cases involving the use of expert testimony are generally fact
specific, certain issues recur often enough to give insight to the courts' attitude
towards those issues. The following cases are again discussed in the context
of the necessity question. Later, some of the same cases are again discussed
in the context of whether the expert testimony was sufficient to establish the
standard of care.
1. Rules Governing Ethical Conduct
In many cases, the argument has been made that the Rules of Professional
Conduct 9 should be used to determine the standard of care in a civil case and
that resort to these Rules obviates the necessity for expert testimony.10
However, the preambles to both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility expressly disclaim any intent
to define liability standards in civil cases.101
92. See Lipscomb v. Krause, 151 Cal. Rptr. 465 (Ct. App. 1978).
93. 275 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
94. Id. at 156.
95. Id. at 156-57.
96. 394 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
97. Id. at 111 (citing Wallace v. Garden City Osteopathic Hosp., 314 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 330 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. 1983) and Wood v. Posthuma, 310
N.W.2d 341 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
98. Id.
99. Either the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the old Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, depending on the jurisdiction and age of the case.
100. See, e.g., Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that an
attorney's ethical duties are established by the Rules of Professional Conduct and cannot be
changed by expert testimony), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1992); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSION-
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Despite the disclaimers, the Rules have been argued as an alternative to
the necessity for expert testimony on the basis that lawyers may not operate
under a lesser standard."w Also, it has been argued that introducing the
Rules into evidence" or a jury instruction explaining the Rules, 104 or
both, would permit a jury of lay persons to decide a legal malpractice case
without expert testimony. In those situations explicitly governed by the Rules,
such as the Rules dealing with conflicts of interest, 1 5 this argument is
persuasive. However, in other cases, even when the Rules are explicit, the
complexity of the transaction or underlying case may be such that a lay person
could not understand how a lawyer should have acted under the circumstances
without expert testimony. Also, proof of a generic ethical duty, such as the
duty to represent a client competently," 6 obviously is of no more assistance
to the jury than is a generic charge of the law of negligence.
In Day v. Rosenthal"° the court not only used the Rules of Professional
Conduct in lieu of expert testimony, but also held that any expert testimony
contrary to the Rules was not admissible.' The facts of Day, however,
clearly fall within the common experience exception. 09
In Betts v. Allstate Insurance Co."0 the court dispensed with expert
testimony in a much more complex situation. Betts involved the delicate
balancing of interests required when an attorney represents both the insured
and the insurer in a liability case' - a difficult, but often recurring,
situation. Most laymen would have no idea how defense attorneys customarily
resolve or deal with this conflict of interest. Therefore, Betts can only be
explained on the basis that the attorney's conduct was so egregious that an
explanation of the standard of care was unnecessary." 2
The majority of courts hold that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not
AL REsPONSMILrrY Preliminary Statement (1983); see also Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646,
652-53 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (stating that in a legal malpractice action, the jury may not be
informed, either directly or indirectly through expert testimony, of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or the Code of Professional Responsibility, because the Rules expressly disclaim any
intent to create civil liability standards).
102. See, e.g., Day, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
103. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 67 (Pa. 1989).
104. See, e.g., Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 378 (Iowa 1987).
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 (1992); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 5 (1983).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1992); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 6 (1983).
107. 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).
108. Id. at 102.
109. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
110. 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Ct. App. 1984).
111. Id. at 545.
112. See id. Ironically, some expert testimony was actually offered at trial. See id. at 545.
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establish the standard of care in civil cases and are not admissible as
evidence.1 3 Other courts hold that the Rules may be used as evidence of the
standard of care,"I and some courts even hold that violation of an applicable
Rule creates a rebuttable presumption of malpractice.I 5  However, only a
few courts hold that proof of a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct is
alone sufficient to establish malpractice without expert testimony." 6
The question of whether the Rules of Professional Conduct are either
determinative of or evidence of the standard of care in civil actions is different
from the question of whether the Rules obviate the necessity for expert
testimony. The few cases holding that expert testimony is not required are
generally based on the common knowledge exception or violation of an
explicit Rule of Professional Conduct, or a combination of both.'
On the other hand, those cases holding that the Rules do not establish the
standard of care do not further preclude expert witnesses from basing their
opinion on the attorney's violation of the Rules."' These cases recognize
that the Rules are not designed to explain the standard of care in civil actions,
but instead recognize that attorney conduct that violates the Rules may not
involve a breach of duty to a client. 9 However, the Rules do provide a
good guide even though at times they may coincide with the duties and
113. See Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381-82 (Mass. 1986) ("Expert testimony
concerning the fact of an ethical violation is not appropriate .... A judge can instruct the jury
(or himself) concerning the requirements of ethical rules."); Hooper v. Gill, 557 A.2d 1349,
1352 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (The general rule that violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
does not give rise to civil liability "has been adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts."),
cert. denied, 564 A.2d 1182 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); Ambrosio &
McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 1360-61 ("[Mlost courts that have addressed the issue hold that
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to an independent cause of action
against the attorney nor are the Rules themselves a substitute for the legal standard of care in
malpractice cases.") (citations omitted).
114. See Mayol v. Summers, Watson & Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d 1176, 1186 (l1. App. Ct.)
(holding that the trial court could quote the Code of Professional Responsibility in its jury
instructions), appeal denied, 596 N.E.2d 630 (111. 1992); Fishman, 487 N.E.2d at 1381 ("[I]f a
plaintiff can demonstrate that a disciplinary rule was intended to protect one in his position, a
violation of that rule may be some evidence of the attorney's negligence."); Martinson Bros. v.
Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
"merely constituted evidence to be considered by the trier of fact.").
115. Beattie v. Firnschild, 394 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Sawabini v.
Desenberg, 372 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1976)).
116. See Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1048 (1986); Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 378 (Iowa 1987); Rizzo v. Haines, 555
A.2d 58, 67 (Pa. 1989).
117. See Day, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 102; Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 378; Rizzo, 555 A.2d at 66.
118. See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (en bane).
119. See, e.g., Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 573 N.E.2d 159, 163 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989).
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standards applicable in a given case.12 Usually, these cases hold that expert
testimony is necessary to explain the standard of care unless the common
experience exception applies. Although the Rules may be one factor
considered by the expert, expert testimony must still be provided to explain the
standard of care. 12'
Those cases holding that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
may be evidence of or create a rebuttable presumption of malpractice still
require expert testimony, unless the case falls within the common experience
exception."22 As the court explained in Northwestern Life Insurance Co. v.
Rogers: '2
It is clear that there can be instances where noncompliance with the Code
of Professional Responsibility does not result in malpractice. Before legal
malpractice can occur, the client must have incurred damages which were
directly and proximately caused by the attorney's malpractice. Because of
the very nature and complexity of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the conduct of legal matters, expert testimony is required to support
the allegations except in those cases which are so patently obvious as to
negate this requirement.'24
The interplay between the Rules of Professional Conduct and expert
testimony raises substantial questions about the scope and sufficiency of the
expert testimony. For practical purposes, the Rules do not have a material
impact on the question of whether expert testimony is needed in cases when
the attorney has violated a Rule of Professional Conduct - although violation
of a Rule does have an impact on the scope and sufficiency of testimony
required. In summary, unless the common experience exception applies, the
practitioner must be prepared to present expert testimony on the standard of
care even if the Rules do apply.
2. Failure to Prosecute or Defend
The common experience exception is most often applied in cases alleging
that the attorney failed to prosecute or defend a claim. An attorney allowing
a statute of limitations to run is the most common example of a malpractice
case that does not require expert testimony.125 The statute of limitations
120. See, e.g., Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, 813 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Tenn.
1991).
121. See Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Mont. 1987); NorthwesternLife Ins. Co.,
573 N.E.2d at 163-64; Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 407; Hizey, 830 P.2d at 654.
122. See Beattie v. Firnschild, 394 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
123. 573 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
124. Id. at 163-64.
125. E.g., Gray v. Hallett, 525 N.E.2d 89 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 245 (Ii.
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cases frequently involve the failure of the attorney to properly research or
investigate the claim,126 which by itself may fall within the common experi-
ence exception. However, when a question exists concerning either the
interpretation or applicability of the statute of limitations, the case may require
expert testimony.12 7 For example, in Koeller v. Reynolds s2 1 the court held
that expert testimony was required because the defendant's explanation for not
filing within the statute of limitations was that he did not think the plaintiff had
a just claim.1
29
Some courts have held that a default judgment caused by the attorney's
failure to file required documents does not require expert testimony to
establish a prima facie malpractice case. 30 For example, in Asphalt Engi-
neers, Inc. v. GaIushaT3 the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the
attorney's failure to file various liens and foreclosure actions supported a
finding of negligence without expert witness testimony. 32
However, Lenius v. King33 is illustrative of the danger in not retaining
an expert in what appears to be a common experience case.13 In Lenius the
South Dakota Supreme Court held that the reasons underlying the attorney's
failure to prosecute for over six years, resulting in the dismissal of the action,
were sufficiently complex to require expert testimony concerning whether the
attorney deviated from the standard of care.'3
1988); House v. Maddox, 360 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So.
2d 890 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626 (Miss. 1987); Brizak v.
Needle, 571 A.2d 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 (N.J. 1990); see
also 2 MALLEN & SMrEH, supra note 5, § 27.15, at 672 ("The most common occurrence, a
statute of limitations missed because of the attorney's inadvertent failure to ascertain or properly
calendar the date when suit or action must be pursued, does not require expert testimony.");
DiSabatino, supra note 12, § 5 (discussing numerous cases in which expert testimony has not
been required to establish legal malpractice when the attorney allows the statute of limitations to
run).
126. See, e.g., Watkins, 278 So. 2d at 892; Hickox, 502 So. 2d at 636; Brizak, 571 A.2d at
983.
127. E.g., Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784, 792-93 (D.S.C. 1992),
aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993) (mem.); Brainerd v. Kates, 386 N.E.2d 586, 589-90 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979).
128. 344 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).
129. Id. at 561.
130. See Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 87-88 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989); see also Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Tyler, 291 S.E.2d 6, 11 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982) (requiring expert testimony, but stating in dicta that no expert testimony would be
necessary if an attorney allowed a case to go into default).
131. 770 P.2d 1180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
132. Id. at 1182.
133. 294 N.W.2d 912 (S.D. 1980).
134. Id. at 914.
135. Id. at 914-15.
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3. Errors of Judgment
i. Trial Tactics
Yn attorney who exercises good faith and informed judgment is not liable
for an error in judgment. The rule is well stated in Hodges v. Carter"16 as
follows:
An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his
advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is not
answerable for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law
which has not been settled by the court of last resort in his State and on
which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well informed lawyers. 37
In order to overcome this judgmental immunity rule, a plaintiff must show that
the judgment exercised did not meet the standard of care that a reasonably
prudent attorney would have exercised under the same or similar circumstanc-
es.
In Rorrer v. Cooke138 the court referred to rules developed in medical
malpractice actions to explain how judgmental immunity interacts with the
standard of care.'39 The court stated, "The applicable standard, then, is
completely unitary in nature, combining in one test the exercise of 'best
judgment,' 'reasonable care and diligence' and compliance with the 'standards
of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar communities. ' '
Rorrer involved a legal malpractice case arising out of the prosecution of
a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney
failed to properly investigate and to present evidence at the trial of the medical
malpractice case.' 4' The defendant asserted that he exercised his best
judgment and used reasonable care in the exercise of his legal skills. 42 The
trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of judgmental immuni-
ty. 43 However, on appeal, the judgment was reversed. In opposition to the
attorney's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff had presented an affidavit
from an attorney experienced in medical malpractice cases who opined that the
136. 80 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1954).
137. Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
138. 317 S.E.2d 34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 329 S.E.2d 355 (N.C.
1985).
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id. at 40 (quoting Wall v. Stout, 311 S.E.2d 571, 577 (N.C. 1984)).
141. Id. at 38.
142. Id. at 36.
143. See Rorrer, 317 S.E.2d at 36-37.
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defendant had argued a medical theory that was untenable in that the medical
expert witnesses at trial were not supportive of the theory."4 The affiant
further opined that the defendant had failed to consult with and discover
evidence from other attending physicians. 45 The plaintiff asserted that such
failure was a deviation from the standard for handling medical malpractice
cases.146 The court held that the plaintiff's affidavit created a question of
fact on the negligence issue, and the exercise of the attorney's judgment would
not be a defense if his judgment amounted to a deviation from the standard of
care. 147
This case is a good example of the critical nature of expert testimony
when an error of judgment is alleged. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
noted that the cases in which the courts were most reluctant to find negligence
on the part of an attorney without expert testimony are those cases involving
matters of judgment, such as trial tactical decisions. 4 Other examples of
judgmental decisions that require expert testimony include: the election of
theories to include in a pleading,"' joinder of parties, 5 ' introduction of
evidence of expert testimony,"' and choice of defenses.'52
Of course, the mere assertion of a judgmental immunity defense would be
ineffective and would not require expert testimony if the common experience
exception applies. The defense must relate to the exercise of professional
judgment rather than the exercise of mere common sense.5 3
ii. Law Which Is Unsettled or Uncertain
Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin"5 4 is a good example of the need
for expert testimony in areas where the law is uncertain or unsettled. In
Cianbro the defendant attorney was retained to file and foreclose a mechanic's
lien. 55 The applicable statute required the lien to be filed within ninety days
144. Id. at 37.
145. Id. at 38.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Rorrer, 317 S.E.2d at 39 (citing DiSabatino, supra note 12, at 174); see also Ambrosio
& McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 1367 (discussing attorney judgment errors and the standard of
care).
149. Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112-13 (Iowa 1975).
150. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 343-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985).
151. Mayol v. Summers, Watson & Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d 1176 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
596 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. 1992) (mem.).
152. Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 874-75 (N.D. 1985).
153. See Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 119 (Kan. 1984).
154. 804 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993) (mem.).
155. Id. at 786.
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of the last work done, but did not prohibit an earlier filing. The foreclosure
section of the statute further required suit to be filed within six months from
the date of the last work done. The attorney filed the action within that six
months, but more than six months after the lien was filed."5 6
In this case, there was disagreement between the master-in-equity and the
circuit court concerning whether the action was timely filed.' 57 However,
the court of appeals held it was not timely filed and dissolved the lien. 8
The attorneys retained to prosecute the mechanic's lien action were then sued
for malpractice.159
The district court in Cianbro observed that there was no prior case
interpreting the statute. 1"° Therefore, "an attorney cannot be held liable for
following the plain terms of a statute when there are not compelling circum-
stances to suggest that the attorney should have acted other than in conformity
with the statute.""' Moreover, the court held that expert testimony was
essential to establish the applicable standard of care and its alleged breach in
the defendant's failure to timely file actions to foreclose the mechanic's
liens.162 The court further held that expert testimony was required on the
issue of whether the defendant attorney should have recognized the uncertainty
of the law and informed his client of the risks. 63 There was no evidence in
the record of what other lawyers of reasonable prudence would have done
under the same or similar circumstances. As a result, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney.
64
In Devine v. Wilson" a client lost his right of judicial review of an
employment termination case because his attorney failed to serve the petition
for judicial review properly." The defendant attorney argued that at the
time of the service, the law was unclear about which parties should be served.
The court conceded that the question of service was one of first impression
and held that an attorney is not required to predict future decisions that clarify
the law. 67 Therefore, the court stated that in these types of cases, expert
testimony is essential to establish the requisite standard of care."16 However,
156. Id. at 787.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 787.
159. Cianbro Corp., 804 F. Supp. at 788.
160. Id. at 790.
161. Id. at 790.
162. Id. at 790-91.
163. Id. at 792.
164. Cianbro Corp., 804 F. Supp. at 793,
165. 373 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
166. Id. at 157.
167. Id. at 157-58.
168. Id. at 158.
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because the plaintiff did not offer any expert testimony, the court affirmed the
grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 69
Where the law is unclear, but there is reason to believe that a particular
course of action being pursued may be adverse to the client, the attorney has
a duty to advise the client of the potential exposure if his interpretation is
incorrect. 
1 70
iii. Failure to Inform
The duty of the attorney to keep the client informed arises in a variety of
ways. This duty includes the duty to disclose and the duty to give the client
adequate information to make a decision, such as whether or not to settle a
matter. In conflict of interest cases, the issue of non-disclosure or the
adequacy of disclosure is often at dispute.
In ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders,
Inc. 7 ' the plaintiff alleged that its corporate attorney had breached his
fiduciary duty and acted adversely to its interests by secretly representing a
competitor's interests."' The attorney's position was that his representation
was a "competing," not a "conflicting," interest.'7 The court rejected the
client's claim in the absence of expert testimony and noted that "[u]nless the
conflict is so clear as to be undisputed, expert testimony is generally necessary
to prove lawyer malpractice."174
The attorney's duty to inform was also at issue in Reed v. Verwoerdt. 75
In that case, the client answered the attorneys fee collection suit with a claim
of legal malpractice alleging that her attorneys failed to adequately disclose the
basis of their fee. 76 The client's mother was killed in an accident. Subse-
quently, the client hired the defendant attorneys on a one-third contingency fee
basis to represent her in the wrongful death and survival actions.' 7  The
attorneys settled the case on a structured basis for $180,960. The plaintiff
then entered into a new fee agreement with the client for a fee of $60,320.00.
The client's new fee agreement provided for a lump sum payment of
169. Id.
170. First Nat'l Bank v. Diane, Inc., 698 P.2d 5, 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Smith v.
Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d
1131 (5th Cir. 1974)).
171. 413 N.E.2d 1299 (Ill. 1980).
172. Id. at 1308-09.
173. Id. at 1310.
174. Id. at 1311 (citing Schmidt v. Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 394
N.E.2d 559 (ill. App. Ct. 1979)).
175. 490 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
176. Id. at 424, 427.
177. Id. at 423.
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$50,320.00 with the balance to be paid in monthly installments. The client
paid all but $10,000 of the fee.' When the attorneys sued for the balance
of their fee, the client asserted that the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty
to her by failing to disclose that the second fee agreement actually amounted
to more than one-third of the settlement." 9 The plaintiff offered no expert
testimony "with regard to the standard of care an attorney must meet in
devising contingent fee contracts based upon a structured settlement."'so
The court found the absence of such evidence to be fatal to the plaintiff's
claim.18'
In Bernian v. Rubin"n the court held that expert testimony was required
to prove the alleged negligence of an attorney who failed to explain adequately
a settlement agreement for alimony and child support in a divorce case." 3
When an attorney fails to inform a client of a settlement offer, however, a
number of courts have held that expert testimony is not required under the
common experience exception." Additionally, when the question involves
the propriety of recommending a settlement offer, as opposed to the attorney's
failure to communicate the offer, an expert probably will be necessary because
the fact that the attorney made a recommendation raises the issue of the
attorney's judgment."
iv. Drafting and Recording Documents
The subject of drafting and recording documents frequently produces legal
malpractice claims. Once again, the cases go both ways on the necessity of
expert testimony.
A client sued an attorney for omitting a residuary clause from a will in
Hamilton v. Needham.186  The defendant lawyers asserted that expert
testimony defining the standard of care was required." The court held that
"[a] lawyer who admits that he omitted from a will a residuary clause
requested by the testator and thereby causes the residual estate to pass by
intestate succession has facially demonstrated an obvious lack of care and skill.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 427.
180. Reed, 490 So. 2d at 427.
181. See id. at 428.
182. 227 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
183. Id. at 806.
184. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Joos v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58,
66-67 (Pa. 1989).
185. See McCafferty v. Musat, 817 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
186. 519 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1986).
187. Id. at 174.
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No expert need guide the factfinder here."'
On the other hand, in Wilkinson v. Rives8 9 the court held that expert
testimony was required when an attorney, in drafting a homestead exemption,
had omitted an optional affidavit that would have given the client the benefit
of certain presumptions. 191 The court deemed the applicable standard of care
to be beyond the common knowledge of laymen.19' Additionally, in Brown
v. Gitlin"9 the court held that expert testimony was required in deciding
whether an attorney's failure to record a sale of stock as required by state law
was negligence, because there was a question of whether the sale of a business
was a transaction covered by the securities laws.'9g However, in Practical
Offset, Inc. v. Davis'94 the same court suggested that when an attorney's
failure to record a financing statement to perfect a security interest disclosed
an obvious and undisputed breach of duty, expert testimony would not be
required. 
95
Finally, in Stewart v. Sbarro'96 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
expert testimony was not necessary to prove malpractice of a seller's attorney
who, in the sale of a business, failed to obtain for his clients a properly
executed bond and mortgage with the proper recording."9 The attorney's
negligence caused his clients to become unsecured creditors when the business
subsequently went bankrupt. The court reached this conclusion by applying
the common experience exception.'
VI. SCOPE AND SUFFICIENCY OP EXPERT TESTIMONY
The topic of scope and sufficiency of expert's testimony moves beyond
the question of whether an expert is necessary in order to establish a prima
facie case. Included points of discussion are the expert's qualifications and the
substance of the proposed testimony. The initial question to be addressed is
whether the witness is qualified to offer expert testimony. Second, under what
circumstances should the court permit the expert witness to testify?
188. Id. at 175.
189. 172 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
190. Id. at 256.
191. Id. at 256-57.
192. 313 N.E.2d 180 (Il1. App. Ct. 1974).
193. Id. at 182-83.
194. 404 N.E.2d 516 (Ii1. App. Ct. 1980).
195. Id. at 523. However, in this case, expert testimony was submitted by the plaintiff in the
form of an expert's affidavit. Id.
196. 362 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 371 A.2d 63 (N.J.
1976).
197. Id. at 587.
198. Id.
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A. Qualifications of the Expert Witness
1. General
The question of the sufficiency of the expert's qualifications is initially a
matter of law for the court and is further a matter of discretion. 99 Once an
expert has been qualified, inexperience that detracts from the expert's
qualifications becomes a matter of weight as opposed to admissibility.2'
These general rules govern expert witnesses in all types of cases.
The issues regarding qualifications of experts in legal malpractice cases
are complicated by the fact that the practice of law has become highly
specialized, particularly in urban areas. Although only a few legal areas are
recognized as specialties, many lawyers limit their practices to one or two
selected areas, such as personal injury, workers compensation, real estate law,
and family law, among others. Additionally, some of these specialties have
sub-specialties. To practice in the highly technical areas such as medical
malpractice and securities regulation, practitioners must possess highly
developed skills and knowledge. Yet, any general practitioner who has a
license may attempt to practice in any of these specialized areas.
Another complicating factor is locality. Each jurisdiction licenses
attorneys, but many attorneys practice across state lines. Even within a single
jurisdiction, the question of comparing a practice in an urban area to one in
a rural area raises questions about the qualifications of expert witnesses.
One of the more recent cases to examine the question of qualifications in
some depth is Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman. 01 In Jeffer the
attorneys were employed to assist in the takeover of an application for a
savings and loan association charter, a complicated and risky venture that
ultimately failed because the parties were unable to obtain a certificate from
the federal regulators.m2 The attorneys sued for their fees, and the defen-
dant cross-claimed for malpractice based upon a failure to warn of the risk
involved.2 3 The defendants offered an expert witness who had extensive
experience with savings and loan laws. The expert's firm had filed applica-
tions for savings and loans that were approved at the state level, but not at the
federal level. The witness testified that he was familiar with the rules and that
he had an ongoing acquaintance with the regulators. However, the witness
had not actually carried an application through to conclusion and obtained
199. See 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 5, § 27.17, at 681.
200. Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman, 286 Cal. Rptr. 243, 250 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Brown v. Colm, 522 P.2d 688 (Ca. 1974)).
201. 286 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Ct. App. 1991).
202. Id. at 244-45.
203. Id. at 244.
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approval with a certificate 'being issued.204 The trial court stated "'I think
anyone who has not carried an application through to completion with the
issuance of a certificate and insurance is not qualified.' "2' Without the
expert testimony, the defendant's cross-claim was nonsuited. 1
On appeal, the court reversed and found as follows:
a. "A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he or she has special
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him
or her as an expert on the subject to which the testimony relates."I
b. A broad standard of qualification is as appropriate in legal malpractice
cases as it is in medical malpractice cases because an overly strict rule may
make it impossible to secure a qualified expert witness.' °s
c. It is not necessary that expert witnesses actually have performed the
same or exact function about which they propose to testify if the witness
otherwise has experience, training, or knowledge of the area at issue.209
d. The party offering the expert must demonstrate that the expert's
knowledge is sufficient. Whether such demonstration has sufficiently been
made is a determination left to the discretion of the trial judge.210
e. If the witness is otherwise qualified, the witness's inexperience goes
to the weight and not admissibility of the testimony. 2"
In Cleckner v. Dale22 plaintiffs sought to introduce expert testimony
concerning the standard of care for lawyers representing clients in real estate
closings and whether the defendant attorney's conduct met that standard. 13
The trial court declined to admit the evidence because it intended to provide
detailed instructions to the jury.2 4 The appellate court reversed. 215  The
court recognized that "the standard of care applicable to a particular case will
vary depending on the type of legal activity involved."2"6 For instnce, the
standard applicable to civil litigators could be different from those for a real
estate lawyer.217 The court observed "[t]he varied nature of the practice of
law underscores the necessity of expert proof intended to acquaint the finder
204. Id. at 245.
205. Id. (quoting the trial court's opinion).
206. See Glickan, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
207. Id. at 246 (quoting CAL. Evm. CODE § 720(a) (West 1966)).
208. Id. at 246-47.
209. Id. at 247-48.
210. Id. at 249.
211. Glickman, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 249 (citing Brown v. Colim, 522 P.2d 688 (Ca. 1974)).
212. 719 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
213. Id. at 539.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 543.
216. Id. at 540 n.4.
217. Cleckner, 719 S.W.2d at 540 n.4.
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of fact with the applicable professional standard in each case.""' Although
qualification was not directly in issue in Cleckner, the case recognizes that an
expert's qualifications should relate to the particular practice involved. To
hold otherwise is to invite outcome-oriented testimony.
Two Washington cases illustrate issues regarding qualifications of expert
witnesses. In Walker v. Bangs219 the plaintiff alleged negligence by his
former attorney in handling a longshoreman's maritime personal injury
claim.' The court noted that a person who holds himself out as a specialist
or as possessing greater than ordinary knowledge in a field would be held to
the standard of a specialist in that area.22 Further, the court refused to find
an otherwise qualified expert witness to be unqualified for the sole reason that
he was not a member of the local bar.m Instead, the court focused on the
experience of the plaintiff's witness, who had prepared and tried similar cases.
The expert's personal participation in similar litigation was sufficient to qualify
the witness. Therefore, the court found that the trial court erred in excluding
the expert's testimony simply because he was not licensed in Washington.w
Subsequently, in Hizey v. Carpenter2 the court rejected the contention
that the defendant should be held to a higher standard than ordinary care
because he held himself out as a "specialist" in real estate law.2 The court
stated that there was no recognized "real estate specialist" standard of care and
further held that the language in Walker regarding specialists was dictum
2 6
Finally, the court noted that the jury was correctly charged with the standard
of "a reasonably prudent lawyer ... in the same or similar circumstanc-
es."' Because the court did not overrule Walker but rather limited it,
presumably, an analogy can be made between the standard of care and an
expert witness's qualifications.22
Therefore, the question of qualifications is initially whether the witness's
training and experience enables the witness to establish the applicable standard
for the defendant attorney in the underlying case. If a defendant attorney
practices in a specialized area, then the expert must be qualified in that same
area.Y9 For example, in Wright v. Williams2 a malpractice action involv-
218. Id.
219. 601 P.2d 1279 (Wash. 1979) (en bane).
220. Id. at 1281.
221. Id. at 1283.
222. Id. at 1232.
223. Id. (noting that nonadmittance to the local bar should go to the weight, not the
admissibility, of the expert's testimony).
224. 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992) (en bane).
225. Id. at 655.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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iug an attorney who held himself out as a specialist, the California Court of
Appeals held that only an attorney knowledgeable about the particular specialty
can qualify to define the standard of care and opine whether it was met. 1
2. Geographical Considerations - The Locality Rule
In measuring the skill, diligence, and practice of an attorney, some courts
have taken into consideration the locality or community in which the attorney
practices as an element in determining the applicable standard of care. This
consideration is one of much disagreement and debate. 2  Various courts
have held that the locality may be the community, the county, or the state.?1
3
In areas of federal law, it had been argued that the requisite standard of care
should be a national one. 4
The locality rule has been eroded to a large degree in medical malpractice
cases. Therefore, arguments have been made that it likewise should not be
applied in legal malpractice cases. Basically, the prevailing arguments are as
follows: First, the rule is an inappropriate anachronism considering modern
educational standards and communication. Second, the rule serves to protect
pockets of incompetence. 235 However, the legal profession is different from
the medical profession. Legal practice is affected by local customs and
attitudes, as is evidenced by the practice of associating local counsel in many
cases.
The application of a locality rule may affect the qualification of an expert
witness. In Cook v. Irion 6 the plaintiff's expert was admitted in Texas, but
practiced in a different county than the defendant attorney.7 The issue was
whether the defendant attorney was negligent in failing to join other parties as
defendants in the plaintiff's personal injury case. 8 The trial court permitted
230. 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1975).
231. Id. at 200.
232. See generally Fagerlund, supra note 12 (discussing the locality rule and its relation to the
standard of care); John R. Skelton, Note, The Locality Rule in Legal Malpractice Litigation: An
Inappropriate Method of Defining the Required Standard of Care, 9 W. NEW ENG. LAw REV.
395 (1986).
233. Fagerlund, supra note 12, at 678.
234. See Walker v. Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Wash. 1979) (en banc). The court did
not address plaintiffs argument for a national standard of practice for a trial specialist. Id. at
1283.
235. Russo v. Griffin, 510 A.2d 436, 437-38 (Vt. 1986) (citing Skilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Hospital Assoc., 349 A.2d 245, 248 (Md. 1978)).
236. 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), overruled in part by Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774
S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (disapproving an exception to attorney negligence based on the
attorney's subjective good faith).
237. Id. at 477.
238. Id. at 476.
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the expert to testify that the defendant had not practiced to the standards of a
general practitioner in the state of Texas. 9 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the case involved the exercise of judgment in light of local
conditions and that the expert, who had not tried a case in the county in
question, was not qualified.' The court stated:
[A]n attorney practicing in a vastly different locality would not be qualified
to second-guess the judgment of an experienced attorney of the El Paso
County Bar as to who should be joined as additional party defendants....
[Tihe probable make-up of the jury panel is an important consideration of
whom to sue where there is an option. The importance of knowledge of
the local situation is fully demonstrated by the well-recognized practice
among the lawyers of this State in associating local counsel in the trial of
most important jury cases.241
The Vermont Supreme Court criticized the locality rule in Russo v.
Griffin.U2 In Russo the attorney who prepared the necessary documents for
his client to buy out a shareholder was sued for failing to include a covenant
not to compete.243 Two of defendant's experts testified that the defendant
attorney had complied with the local standard of practice in Rutland, Vermont.
However, the plaintiff offered expert testimony that defendant's conduct did
not comport with standards for the state of Vermont. The trial court accepted
the testimony of the defendant's experts.'" On appeal, the court reversed,
holding that the applicable standard of care should not be that of a community,
stating:
The shortcomings of the locality rule are well recognized. It
immunizes persons who are sole practitioners in their community from
malpractice liability and it promotes a "conspiracy of silence" in the
plaintiffs' locality which, in many cases, effectively precludes plaintiffs
from retaining qualified experts to testify on their behalf.245
Despite this criticism, the court did not entirely abandon the geographical
consideration. It held that the relevant geographical area was not the
community where the attorney works or the nation as a whole, but rather the
239. Id. at 477.
240. Id.
241. Cook, 409 S.W.2d at 478.
242. 510 A.2d 436 (Vt. 1986).
243. Id. at 437.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 437-38 (citing Skilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Assoc., 349 A.2d 245,
249 (Md. 1975)).
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jurisdiction in which the attorney was licensed to practice.246
In several Georgia cases, the courts expressly recognized the need for
expert testimony concerning a general standard of care by all members of the
legal profession rather than a standard for a specific geographic location.247
For example, in Kellos v. Sawilowsk 48 the court even rejected testimony
about the standard of care applicable to the State of Georgia and affirmed a
summary judgment based on the absence of any testimony concerning the more
broad standard of generally accepted professional legal conduct.249
3. The Judge As an Expert
In a number of cases, one of the parties may call an active judge as a
witness, including the trial judge in the underlying action." However,
Mallen and Smith are highly critical of this practice:
Public policy and ethical considerations militate against the trial judge
testifying as an expert witness in litigation involving parties who previously
appeared before him. Ethical mandates governing judicial conduct dictate
that a judge should not create the appearance of impropriety. Opinion
testimony by a judge creates the appearance of partiality on behalf of a
litigant, is greatly prejudicial to the adverse party, and raises the suspicion
of judicial favoritism in the prior litigation.2s'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed similar concerns in Helmbrecht
v. St. Paul Insurance Co." 2 In that case, one of the parties called the trial
judge in the original divorce action to testify about the fairness of a divorce
settlement and what the outcome of the case would have been if the parties had
gone to trial.251 The supreme court criticized the practice of calling the trial
judge as a witness and held that the problem could be and should be avoided
by using an objective standard of what a reasonable trial judge would have
done, rather than the more subjective standard of what the particular judge
handling the case would have done.254 Further, given the potential for unfair
246. Id. at 438.
247. Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 322 S.E.2d 897, 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 325 S.E.2d 757
(Ga. 1985); Storrs v. Wills, 316 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Gibson v. Talley, 275
S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
248. 322 S.E.2d 897 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 325 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. 1985).
249. Id. at 898.
250. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 5, § 27.17, at 683.
251. Id. at 683 (citations omitted).
252. 362 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1985).
253. Id. at 123.
254. Id. at 124-25.
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prejudice, the court held it was an error to allow the trial judge to testify as
an expert witness in a malpractice case. 5
4. The Respective Roles of the Trial Judge and the Expert Witness
i. Testimony about the Law
Confusion results in many legal malpractice cases concerning the
respective roles of the trial judge and the expert witness for several reasons.
First, the lawyer's conduct is measured by a standard of care that will be
influenced by the lawyer's perception of the law and the perception of the
reasonably prudent lawyer against which one measures the defendant attorney's
conduct. The trial judge is obligated to define the legal duties owed by the
lawyer, but generally the judge may not substitute his or her own perceptions
of what the law is as an expert. 6 Therefore, because it is the trial judge's
function to instruct the jury on the law, an expert should not testify about the
law or offer any legal conclusions."
In many cases, litigants can avoid the problem by having the expert
describe the standard of care in terms of what lawyers do in their practice
rather than referring to any perceived legal requirement or duty. The trial
court, on the other hand, will instruct the jury on the legal duties arising from
the general law of negligence and the specific duties owed by lawyers by
reference to statutes, rules, and case law. For example, in any case involving
the alleged failure to properly investigate and try a medical malpractice case,
the expert would testify about how the community of lawyers handle such
cases. The expert's testimony will cover, among other things, how a lawyer
in the community would generally conduct an investigation, what types of
persons they would consult and interview, how a theory of liability is
developed, and what witnesses would normally be called at trial. Then, the
trial judge's instructions to the jury would include the law of negligence, the
duty of a lawyer to investigate the client's case, and the lawyer's obligations
255. Id. at 126.
256. Bonhiver v. Rotenberg, Schwartzman & Richards, 461 F.2d 925, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1972)
(citing People v. Wallenberg, 181 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ill. 1962)); see supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text.
257. Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Marx & Co.
v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977)); Practical
Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 404 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (noting the impropriety of
conclusions of law in expert's affidavit); Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991) (holding experts may not offer testimony regarding conclusions of law) (citing Rhine v.
Haley, 378 S.W.2d 655, 662 (Ark. 1964)); Chocktoot v. Smith, 571 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Or. 1977)
(en banc) (noting expert testimony should not invade the province of the jury) (citing Shields v.
Campbell, 559 P.2d 1275 (Or. 1977)).
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to practice according to the prevailing standards of other lawyers in the
area." In areas where the law is unclear or uncertain, the attorney's
perception of the law, as well as that of the legal community, may be
important.
25 9
Nevertheless, the issue remains how lawyers conduct themselves in a
particular situation and not the state of the law at the time. The issue of what
the law was at the time is one for the court. On the other hand, the issue of
how lawyers conducted themselves in light of the prevailing situation is one
for the expert.' This was the main issue in Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat &
Martin." In Cianbro, the attorney was mistaken in his view of the law
regarding the length of time within which to file an action to enforce a
mechanic's lien.2 2 However, the question was not what the law actually
was, but what the practice of attorneys in filing mechanic's liens was at the
time and whether the defendant deviated from that standard.263 The actual
requirement of the statute and the status of the law at the time was a question
for the court. The question of what attorneys actually did was a question of
fact on which expert testimony was required.2"
a. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
In some cases, the separation of the standard of practice and the state of
the law is difficult in that they are so interwoven that they present mixed
questions of law and fact. For example, in a complex tax case, the complexity
of the law and the defendant attorney's conduct can be so interwoven that an
expert may not be able to explain the requisite standard of care without also
explaining the intricacies of the law. In cases with mixed questions of law and
fact, commentators have suggested that the trial judge should first hear the
testimony outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the expert's
legal premises are compatible with the anticipated jury instructions and then
admit only that part of the testimony that the court finds to be in harmony with
its view of the law.'
258. See Quality Inns Int'l v. Booth, Fish, Simpson, Harrison, & Hall, 292 S.E.2d 755, 762-
63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
259. See supra notes 154-170 and accompanying text.
260. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 5, § 27.16, at 678-79.
261. 804 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993) (mem.).
262. Id. at 787-88.
263. Id. at 792.
264. See id. at 791-92 (citing Berman v. Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802, 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)).
265. Baker, supra note 4, at 343; Expert Legal Testimony, supra note 4, at 811-13 (stating that
conflicting expert legal testimony not in conformity with the judge's formulation should be
excluded).
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b. Legal Conclusions
Sometimes testimony is offered that requires the witness to not only make
a statement of the law or to assume the current status of the law as a part of
his answer, but also to draw a conclusion based on the facts and the issues of
a particular case. As suggested above, attorneys can often avoid this dilemma
in malpractice cases by framing the question so that the witness testifies about
what lawyers do, rather than what their legal obligations to the client are. The
importance of framing questions so that legal conclusions are avoided is
recognized in Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.26 The advisory
committee comment's note the following:
Thus the question, "Did T have capacity to make a will?" would be
excluded, while the question, "Did T have sufficient mental capacity to
know the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his
bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?" would be
allowed.267
A recent North Carolina case, Smith v. Childs,6' describes the general
rules applicable to expert testimony and legal conclusions.269 In Smith the
trial court allowed an attorney expert to give testimony on the legal interpreta-
tion of a contract term.270 The appellate court held that this testimony was
admitted in error because "[a]n expert is not allowed to testify that a particular
legal standard, or legal term of art, has been met."27 The court further
stated that
[wihen the expert witness is an expert legal witness, the avoidance of
testimony regarding legal conclusions can be problematical since attorneys
deal with legal terms of art on a daily basis. However, while an expert
may testify to the existence of the factual components, he may not testify
as to the legal conclusions; such testimony invades the court's province to
determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury on that law.2r
Two Oregon cases further demonstrate the difficult problem of separating
266. See FED. R. EviD. 704 advisory committee's note.
267. Id. (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 12 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
268. 437 S.E.2d 500 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
269. Id. at 505-07.
270. Id. at 506-507.
271. Id. at 506 (citing HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 488
(N.C. 1991)).
272. Id. (citing HAJMM, 403 S.E.2d at 488-89).
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the legal and factual issues. In the first case, Shields v. Campbell,273 the
plaintiff sued her attorney for negligence in representing her in a formal
litigation involving the ownership of a bank account in the joint name of the
plaintiff and her deceased son. 74 The trial court found the estate of the son
owned the account.27 The plaintiff appealed from an adverse judgment
asserting as error the allowance of expert testimony on the ultimate issue. 6
The trial court allowed two experts to testify about their interpretation of two
other Oregon Supreme Court decisions relative to bank account ownership.
The court noted that the plaintiff also called experts who testified that the
defendant attorney had not met the standard of care by his failing to offer into
evidence certain documents relevant to the ownership of the bank ac-
counts.21' The plaintiffs experts opined that if such documents had been
offered, under Oregon law, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the
underlying case.2 78
The court also noted that the plaintiff had not objected to the defendant's
experts' testimony and held that opinion evidence about an ultimate issue was
not improper. 9 The court stated that "[W]e know of no other way in which
the jury could have been guided in determining the issue than the presentation
of opinion by properly qualified experts.""uo
Unfortunately, the court in Shields failed to recognize the distinction
between questions of law and question of fact. The plaintiff's failure to object
to the testimony of the defendant's experts at trial clouds the case, and the
opinion reflects the court's confusion in attempting to separate the legal and
factual issues.
In the second Oregon case, Chocktoot v. Smith,28 ' the supreme court
was again faced with a legal malpractice case involving alleged negligence in
a probate litigation.2n The trial court held that because a judge tried the.
underlying case, it was for the court - and not a jury - to decide how the
former trial would have resulted absent the alleged malpractice. 8 3 On
appeal, the court examined in depth the functions of the judge and jury in legal
malpractice actions.' The court noted that in Shields, testimony concerning
273. 559 P.2d 1275 (Or. 1977) (en bane).
274. Id. at 1277.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1278.
277. Id. at 1278-79.
278. Shields, 559 P.2d at 1279.
279. Id. at 1279-80.
280. Id. at 1280.
281. 571 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1977) (en bane).
282. Id. at 1256-57.
283. Id. at 1257.
284. Id. at 1257-59.
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the law and legal conclusions had been admitted without objection and held
that "the jury cannot decide a disputed issue of law on the testimony of
lawyers."" The court went on to hold that the legal consequences of what
the attorney did or failed to do were matters of argument and not of proof and
were in the first instance to be decided by the court.286 The court held:
The question what decision should have followed in the earlier case if
the defendant attorneys had taken proper legal steps is a question of law
for the court. Consequently, such legal rulings are also open for briefing
and review on appeal.
The question what outcome should have followed if defendants had
conducted a proper investigation, presentation (or exclusion) of evidence,
or other steps bearing on a decision based on facts remains a question of
fact for the jury .... If the alleged negligence of an attorney in an earlier
case involved both legal and factual elements, it would be necessary for
the trial court to separate these elements and to instruct the jury according-
iy.287
The court concluded that under this standard, it made no difference
whether the prior trial was by a judge or jury. The division of functions in the
subsequent legal malpractice trial should remain the same, and it was error for
the trial court to deny a jury trial. 88
When applying the Chocktoot analysis to the propriety of the proffered
expert testimony, the key element is the distinction between argument and
evidence. When the expert ventures beyond what lawyers do and how they
practice, the expert is impinging on the trial court's function to declare the
law, and the expert's role shifts from that of a witness to that of an advocate.
Judge Learned Hand succinctly stated the wisdom of not allowing this
transition from witness to advocate: "Argument is argument whether in the
box or at the bar, and its proper place is the last. "'
ii. Proximate Cause and Damages
When an expert's testimony ventures beyond establishing the requisite
standard of care, three problems arise. First, the testimony often enters the
realm of legal conclusions, and such testimony invades the province of the
court. Second, the opinion may be speculative and unnecessarily invade the
285. Id. at 1258.
286. Chocktoot, 571 P.2d at 1259.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
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province of the jury. Lastly, there is the philosophical question of the "case
within the case" concept and how it should be applied in a legal malpractice
setting should be considered.
The Court of Appeals of Washington addressed all three of the above
concerns in Halvorsen v. Ferguson,2" in which the alleged malpractice was
the wife's attorney's failure to obtain an adequate interest in the value of
certain corporations and their subsidiaries owned by her husband .29  The
plaintiff's experts theorized that the wife's attorney had breached his duty by
failing to research adequately and advance appropriate legal theories in the
underlying action.29 Therefore, the expert opined that absent the attorney's
alleged malpractice, the trial judge would have found the husband's interests
in the various corporations to be community property.2'
The court noted that legal malpractice cases involve mixed questions of
law and fact.2 The question of whether an attorney erred was one of law,
but if there was an error, the question of whether the error was caused by the
attorney's negligence was one of fact.2m9 Thus, the expert's opinion that an
attorney erred was irrelevant and could be ignored, but the question of
causation was one of fact.
296
The evidence in the malpractice action was that the attorney had presented
evidence in the prior marriage dissolution action to support the theories
asserted by the experts, but the issue simply had been resolved adversely.2'
Thus, the opinion of the plaintiff's expert that a "highly favorable result"29
would have occurred in the underlying action amounted to nothing more than
speculation.2m9 As a result, the plaintiff's expert testimony was legally
insufficient. The court clearly based its analysis on the plaintiff's failure not
only to prove a deviation from the standard of care, but also to prove
proximate cause by creating an issue of fact regarding the effect of the alleged
negligence in the underlying action.3"
The case within the case concept and its relationship to expert testimony
290. 735 P.2d 675 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
291. Id. at 677.
292. The malpractice claim related to the tactical decisions made by the attorney in that the
plaintiff alleged that the attorney had failed to sufficiently emphasize a theory that all the parties
agreed was not supported by any law in that jurisdiction. Id. at 680.
293. Id. at 678.
294. Id.
295. Halvorsen, 735 P.2d at 678-79 (citing R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 659, at 820-21 (2d ed. 1981)).
296. See id.
297. Id. at 677.
298. Id at 683.
299. Id.
300. Halvorsen, 735 P.2d at 683.
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was the subject of discussion in Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Insurance Co.30°
This malpractice action also resulted from a divorce proceeding. 3 2 At the
malpractice trial, the trial judge in the original divorce action testified about
the settlement's fairness and also about how he would have ruled if the case
had been tried. 3 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held this testimony to be
improper.) 4
Under the case-within-a-case concept, the test is objective. 305 There-
fore, the test it is not what the outcome would have been, but rather what it
should have been. This is true whether the original trier of fact was a judge
or jury. The accepted method of trying the case within the case is to prove
what should have been proven in the underlying case. The judge in the
malpractice case decides the issues of law, and the jury decides the issues of
fact.
306
When the attorney's conduct does not involve the destruction of an
underlying claimant's case, the case within the case concept may not apply,
but there still must be proof of a causal connection between the attorney's
conduct and the alleged damages. 301 Expert testimony requirements will
remain essentially the same.
30 1
Additionally, some courts recognize that even in the case within the case
context, expert opinion testimony may be admissible to aid in determining the
reasonableness of the settlement the defendant attorney reached in the
underlying case.30 9 Therefore, the plaintiffs case is not entirely dependent
on the outcome of the case within the case.
B. Sufficiency of the Expert Testimony
In legal malpractice cases requiring expect testimony, the ultimate
question the practitioner faces is whether the proposed expert testimony will
be legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case. As such, the sufficiency
question is a common thread in cases discussing expert witness testimony in
the area of legal malpractice.
301. 362 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1985).
302. Id. at 121.
303. Id. at 123.
304. Id. at 126.
305. See id. at 125.
306. Hembrecht, 362 N.W.2d at 126.
307. See Fiedler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
308. See Nelson v. Taoka, 611 N.E.2d 462, 466-67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), jurisdictional
motion overruled by 605 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio 1993); Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 81-82, 367
S.E.2d 166, 168-69 (Ct. App. 1988).
309. Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1380 (Mass. 1986).
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1. Sufficiency and the Ethical Rules
When the expert proposes to testify to a standard of care based solely
upon the Rules of Professional Conduct, there is a serious risk of the
testimony being held insufficient. In Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone &
Hinds, P.C.10 the plaintiff recovered a substantial verdict against the
defendant attorneys based upon an alleged conflict of interest in representing
multiple parties in a business transaction." In the malpractice trial, one of
the plaintiff's two experts was a professor who based his testimony of the
applicable standard of care on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
However, he was not asked whether he was familiar with the standards for
practice of corporate law in the area. The other expert was a practicing
attorney who acknowledged that he was not familiar with the standard of
corporate practice in the area. Furthermore, he stated that he could not
differentiate between Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules.3 13 The
court commented on the impropriety of using the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as the applicable standard of lawyers practicing in the area by
stating:
Since the Code does not set the standard of care upon which an action for
negligence can be based, expert testimony that a lawyer violated provisions of
the Code is not sufficient evidence to present an issue of fact for the jury. Such
testimony is not evidence of the degree of knowledge, skill, prudence, and
diligence which is commonly possessed and exercised by lawyers practicing
with regard to the same subject matter in that jurisdiction.
3 '4
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
granting of a directed verdict by holding that this testimony was insufficient
as a matter of law because the conduct of lawyers as they actually practiced
controlled the standard of care in a civil setting and not the Model Code of
Professional Conduct." 5
While the Rules of Professional Conduct provide guidance, standing
alone, the Rules do not establish the standard. Lazy Seven represents a view
a number of courts follow, although others disagree.3 16 The party offering
310. 813 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1991).
311. Id. at 403.
312. Id. at 406.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 407.
315. Seven Coals Sales, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 407.
316. See generally Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986) (noting that
while a violation of a cannon of ethics or a disciplinary rule, is not of itself negligence, if the rule
was a protective rule, then it may be some evidence of a an attorney's negligence); Hooper v.
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the expert can avoid the problem by choosing an expert who is qualified to
testify about what actually happens in practice as well as, or in addition to, the
effect of the Rules of Professional Conduct on the standards of practice.
2. The Reasonably Prudent Lawyer
The appropriate standard of care the attorney must comport to is that of
a reasonably prudent lawyer practicing in the same area. Thus, testimony by
an expert that the expert would have performed differently, standing alone, is
legally insufficient to carry an action for legal malpractice.317
One must be careful to avoid other pitfalls when attempting to establish
this appropriate standard. A bald assertion that the attorney has met the
standard of care without reference to the supporting facts is likewise
insufficient.1 ' Additionally, testimony that opines only to possibilities is
considered speculative and is thus held to be insufficient. 19  Finally,
testimony based on interpretations and conclusions of the law rather than the
manner in which attorneys perform their duties is also likely to be found
inadmissible and insufficient.32
VII. CONCLUSION
In all but the most obvious cases expert testimony is necessary in legal
malpractice cases that involve questions of fact. Even when the case appears
to be controlled by a question of law, prudence dictates that an expert be held
in reserve to testify and prepared if necessary. The practitioner must prepare
the testimony so that it is presented in a way to avoid the various pitfalls. On
the other hand, the courts must recognize that parties tend to retain experts
whose testimony will support their case. There is a serious risk of unfairness
and a breakdown of the adversary system if the court does not make a
distinction between arguments and evidence and to restrict an expert's opinions
on purely legal issues. The court, not the expert, should determine the law of
Gill, 557 A.2d 1349, 1352-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (noting the three approaches taken by
various jurisdictions on the effect of an attorney's breach of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, yet declining to decide which approach Maryland will take), cert. denied, 564 A.2d
1182 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
317. Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 874-75 (N.D. 1985) (citing York v.
Stiefel, 440 N.E.2d 440, 446-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds by 458 N.W.2d 488 (Ill. 1983)); Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 735 P.2d 675, 681 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Rorrer v. Cooke, 329 S.E.2d 355, 367 (N.C. 1985)).
318. See, e.g., Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 404 N.E.2d 516, 522 (II1. App. Ct. 1980).
319. Nelson v. Taoka, 611 N.E.2d 462, 466-67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992),jurisdictional motion
overruled by 605 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio 1993).
320. Practical Offset, 404 N.E.2d at 521; Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Rhine v. Haley, 378 S.W.2d 655, 662 (Ark. 1964)).
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the case.
It is a tribute to the legal system and to lawyers that the law of legal
malpractice has developed without a serious problem of "conspiracy of
silence" making it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to obtain experts. The
problem appears to be one of finding a qualified expert rather than the absence
of an expert. Unfortunately, the incidences of legal malpractice cases appear
to be on an upward trend, and the use of expert witnesses in the field
undoubtedly will be the subject of continuing interest and development.
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